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Fighting Piracy With Private Security Measures: When Contract Law
Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank
Abstract

This Article addresses the following question: when should contract law permit parties to discontinue
performance under a private security contract aimed to combat piracy? Piracy has been 'on the rise' off
Somalia and in East Asia, with serious attacks escalating. Some shipping companies have responded by
drafting 'best management practices', hiring security companies to advise on countering the threat and hiring
armed or unarmed security protection. After presenting representative factual situations involving pirate
attacks, the Article describes the traditional approach to defining the obligations of parties and the
performance issues that arise during contractual performance. This approach takes into account interpretation
through reasonable expectations, trade usage and public policy and would deny a party the right to excuse the
failure of performance in instances where the particular risk might be categorized as foreseeable or is expressly
or impliedly allocated to the contracting party. An excuse approach does not necessarily give the parties
guidance as to when security forces onboard a ship attacked by pirates should not attempt to fulfill contractual
obligations, perhaps because performance may escalate the risk to employees of both parties due to the
particular acts of the pirates. This uncertainty of obligation may lead to escalation of the dangers of piracy
necessitating increased use of force or depriving a contracting party of a needed contractual out, leaving the
non-performing security provider in breach. After describing and critiquing efforts to combat piracy, the
Article provides a contractual analysis of the relationship between the private parties, shipper and security
company. It then proposes a approach to the problem of performance that anticipates use of force - one that
would hold parties to the security contracts in most circumstances where the response to piracy is likely to be
effective, but would allow and perhaps encourage cessation of performance in situations that require a
governmental response such that private ordering for use of force is less appropriate, could result in escalation
with the pirates or could increase risk to employees or non-pirate third parties. Employing a comparison to
domestic robbery, an interpretative approach that favors non resistance when pirates actually board should be
not only permitted but encouraged where the risk associated with combating piracy requires a more
governmental response and, therefore, responsibility should remain with the Government or international
community as a whole. The Article concludes with a discussion of the specific balancing of contractual
obligations and public policy and public interest where civilians contract for the use of force implicating the
international community's need to maintain peace.
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FIGHTING PIRACY WITH PRIVATE
SECURITY MEASURES: WHEN CONTRACT
LAW SHOULD TELL PARTIES TO WALK
THE PLANK
JENNIFER S. MARTIN

*

I’m dishonest, and a dishonest man you can always trust to be dishonest.
Honestly. It’s the honest ones you want to watch out for, because you can
never predict when they’re going to do something incredibly . . . stupid.
1
—Jack Sparrow
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INTRODUCTION
2

On April 8, 2009, Somali pirates attacked the Maersk Alabama, an
American cargo ship ferrying food aid to East Africa (the “Maersk
3
Alabama Attack”). The pirates boarded the ship with grappling
4
hooks and ropes from their skiff. After one of the crew members
stabbed the pirate leader’s hand with an ice pick, the crew convinced
5
the pirates to leave the ship on a lifeboat. As part of the deal, the
pirates took the Maersk Alabama’s Captain, Richard Phillips, as a
hostage until the crew released one of the pirates it held as a
6
hostage. When the crew released the pirate hostage, however, the
7
pirates, not surprisingly, did not release Captain Phillips. Instead,
the pirates insisted that the crew of the Maersk Alabama follow the
8
pirates in the lifeboat to Somalia. The conflict led to the arrival of
the USS Bainbridge, which engaged in negotiations with the pirates for
the release of Captain Phillips, and finally, to the shooting of the
pirates once the officers on the Bainbridge believed that the pirates
9
had decided to kill Captain Phillips.
Similar stories can be told of the other 217 pirate attacks that
occurred off the Horn of Africa in 2009, as recorded by the Piracy
Reporting Centre of the International Chamber of Commerce’s
2. Article 101 of the Law of the Sea Convention defines piracy to include:
[A]ny illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or
a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii)
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also BARRY DUBNER, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 1–11 (1980) (suggesting that the 1958 articles fail to
account for modern aspects of piracy). Pirate ships are those which the persons in
control intend to use for the purposes of piracy. UNCLOS, supra, art. 103.
3. Sarah Childress & Peter Spiegel, Snipers Kill Pirates, Save Captain, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 2009, at A1, A10. See generally LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 14–15 (2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40528_20090928.pdf (describing the attack and
response of the M/V Maersk Alabama); Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S.
Captain is Hostage of Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A6, A10 (comparing the attack
to an attack from a Robert Louis Stevenson novel); Robert McFadden & Scott Shane,
Navy Rescues Captain, Killing 3 Pirate Captors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A1, A8
(providing an account of the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips).
4. Childress & Spiegel, supra note 3, at A10.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at A1, A10 (reporting that Navy snipers noticed that a pirate had aimed
an AK-47 machine gun at Captain Phillips’s back and, thus, concluded that the
Captain was in “imminent danger”).
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10

International Maritime Bureau (IMB). In fact, pirates attacked the
Maersk Alabama again in November 2009, but were unsuccessful after
the onboard “security team” responded with small arms fire, evasive
maneuvers, and long-range acoustical devices designed to be painful
11
to the ear. Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of the United
States General Command, observed: “Due to Maersk Alabama
following maritime industry’s best-practices such as embarking
security teams, the ship was able to prevent being successfully
attacked by pirates. This is a great example of how merchant
12
mariners can take pro-active action to prevent being attacked.”
In another incident, pirates seized the M/V Theresa, an attack that
resulted in the death of the North Korean captain of the ship, who
13
the pirates shot and killed after he fired a flare gun. Pirates also
launched an attack on the Ukrainian M/V Juliet that was unsuccessful
14
after the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) “Vessel
15
Protection Detachment” that was onboard the ship returned fire.
When pirates seized the Spanish fishing ship Alakrana, the Spanish
16
government reportedly paid a ransom of more than $3.5 million.
10. ICC Commercial Crime Services, 2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400
(Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:2009worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass-400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
11. See Alan Cowell, Somalia: Second Attack on U.S. Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009,
at A12 (reporting that four men in a skiff came within 300 yards of the ship); Press
Release, Nathan Schaeffer, Naval Forces Central Command, M/V Maersk-Alabama
Repels Suspected Pirate Attack (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2009/195.html (providing a synopsis of the
attack and noting that this was the second incident involving the Maersk Alabama in
2009).
12. Schaeffer, supra note 11.
13. See Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/Africa/19pirates.html
(comparing the Theresa attack with the second attack on the Maersk Alabama); Pirates
Seize N Korea Tanker Crew, BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8363922.stm (noting that Somali pirates began
operating in an area off the Seychelles in order to evade naval forces).
14. The European Union Naval Force Somalia is a European Union military
mission to protect humanitarian vessels from acts of piracy and sea robbery off the
coast of Somalia. See EU NAVFOR Somalia, About Us: Mission,
http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (describing
the aim, mandate, operational parameters, and funding of the European Union’s
military operation against piracy).
15. Pirates Seize N Korea Tanker Crew, supra note 13; see also Press Release, EU
NAVFOR Somalia, Attempted Hijacking of Ukrainian Ship MV Lady Juliet (Nov. 17,
2009), http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/11/attempted-hijacking-ofUkrainian-ship-mv-lady-juliet/ (asserting that the pirates did not realize prior to the
attempted attack that a Vessel Protection Detachment was onboard).
16. Cowell, supra note 13; see also Somali Pirates Free Spanish Boat, BBC NEWS, Nov.
17, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8364530.stm (reporting Spanish Prime
Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s statement that the “government did what it
had to do”).
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Pirates even seized a private yacht, the Lynn Rival, with a retired
17
British couple onboard, who are still in captivity.
The United Nations Security Council has aided nations in fighting
piracy by passing five different resolutions aimed at authorizing
nations to patrol the waters off the Somali coast and to pursue
18
pirates, whether on the high seas or in Somali territorial waters.
Despite the general utility of these resolutions in permitting nations
to police the waters, the nearest patrol vessel was 300 nautical miles
away from the Maersk Alabama when pirates attacked and captured
19
the vessel. Pirate attacks now occur over an area in excess of one
20
million square miles of ocean. Accordingly, patrolling ships will
often be too late to help ward off an attack, as vessels under attack
typically have less than fifteen to thirty minutes from the first pirate
21
sighting to the time the pirates take the vessel. Even when military
force is used, death of crewmembers or escalation of violence can still
17. See Mohamed Olad Hassan & Jill Lawless, Pirates Take British Couple to Base,
Empty Yacht Found By British Navy, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 29, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/29/british-couple-possiblyk_n_338121.html (stating that the pirates boarded the sailboat at night while the
couple was asleep); Kidnapped British Yacht Couple ‘Need Urgent Help’, BBC NEWS, Jan.
31, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/kent/8489958.stm
(reporting that a doctor had visited the captured retirees and that they were being
kept in separate locations).
18. See S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (calling on
states to join together to fight piracy generally); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (encouraging states to address piracy off the coast of
Somalia to help food supplies in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844
(Nov. 20, 2008) (advising states to freeze funds to Somalia partly due to pirate
activity); S.C. Res. 1838, ¶¶ 2, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008) (urging states
to protect themselves and fight piracy off the coast of Somalia); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (encouraging the intensification of efforts off
the coast of Somalia to combat the effects of piracy); see also James Baker, UN Pledges
to Take Fight Against Pirates on to Land; Security Council Passes US-Drafted Resolution to
Toughen Stance in Gulf of Aden, LLOYD’S LIST, Dec. 18, 2008, at 5 (explaining that prior
to the passage of Security Council Resolution 1851, states had only a “limited
mandate to prosecute pirates”); RP Deploying Naval Liaison Officers to Work with US Fleet
in Rescuing RP Seamen Held Hostage by Pirates, PHILIPPINES NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic (search for “Deploying Naval
Liaison Officers to Work” in Philippines News Agency) (recounting Filipino
President Gloria Arroyo’s response to pirate attacks on Filipino seamen); Dominic
Wabala, Russia Seeks Go-Ahead With Attack, DAILY NATION (U.K.), Oct. 23, 2008,
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/483372/-/tlh0sq/-/index.html (discussing
Russia’s attempts to undertake measures sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council to
improve the maritime situation in the Gulf of Aden); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Decides States, Regional Organizations May Use ‘All Necessary
Means’ to Fight Piracy Off Somalia Coast for 12-Month Period, U.N. Doc. SC/9514
(Dec. 2, 2008); Press Release, Security Council, Piracy Off Somali Coast Not Only
Criminal, But Very Successful, Security Council Hears, Cautioned There Could Be
No Peace At Sea Without Stability on Land, U.N. Doc. SC/9793 (Nov. 18, 2009).
19. Mazzetti & Otterman, supra note 3, at A10.
20. Id.
21. PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
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22

occur.
Moreover, while piracy might traditionally have been
perceived as attacks focused on taking a vessel and its contents, crews
have heightened concerns about modern piracy, including the
possibility that pirates will take hostages for ransom.
In addition to the human and military costs of piracy, there are
economic costs that affect global trade, including: payments of
ransom, damages to ships and cargoes, delays in deliveries, increases
in insurance premiums, and measures to secure ships from
23
attack, including private security teams. Recent events suggest that
shipowners are either arming or at least considering arming their
24
vessels to thwart pirate attacks. Yet, historically, contracts between
merchant vessel owners and the security forces hired to combat pirate
attacks have contained no absolute guideposts regarding engagement
with pirates.
Several maritime organizations have published their own guides for
these contracts, but there is no certainty that these standards
25
prevail as a matter of trade usage binding on contracting parties.
For example, various industry groups banded together to publish best
management practices for deterring piracy in the Gulf of Aden and
26
off the coast of Somalia (“Best Management Practices”). The IMB
22. For example, a French naval attack to free a hostage on a small sailboat
resulted in the death of a French citizen during the exchange of fire. Id. at 10.
Additionally, after the U.S. Navy killed three pirates in order to save Captain Phillips
of the Maersk Alabama, the pirate leaders vowed to attack and kill Americans in the
future. Id. at 11.
23. PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 12; see also Lawrence J. Kahn, Pirates, Rovers, and
Thieves: New Problems with an Old Enemy, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 293, 316–17 (1996)
(discussing the economic effects that pirate attacks have on shipowners). For a
discussion of the impact of piracy on maritime insurance and the options that the
U.S. Congress might consider to address the situation, see RAWLE O. KING, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., OCEAN PIRACY AND ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE 1–10 (2009),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40081_20090206.pdf.
24. See Keith Bradsher, Rescue Revives Debate Over Arming Crews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2009, at A8 (considering the role that firearms played in the Maersk Alabama’s
first attack); Private Security Firms Join Battle Against Somali Pirates, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct.
26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,444103,00.html (reporting that
some maritime organizations have expressed concern about the presence of armed
guards on private vessels); David Isenberg, Yaargh, Here Be Contractors, CATO INST.,
(Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9748
(asserting that private security contractors “have been working the maritime beat for
many years now”). Private security companies like Hollowpoint Protective Services
offer both armed and unarmed guards to assist with combating piracy. Hollowpoint
Protective Services Homepage,
http://www.hollowpointprotection.com/Maritime.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
25. See Anti-Pirate Attack Guidelines Being Ignored, UN Says, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29,
2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8487837.stm (reporting estimates that up
to twenty percent of vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden were ignoring safety
advice).
26. See CHAMBERS OF SHIPPING OF AMERICA, BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER
PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA 1 (2009),
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27

published its “Advice to Masters” (“IMB Advice”). The International
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) published its “Guidance to
Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
28
Against Ships (“IMO Guidance”).
These guides illustrate that
maritime organizations consider the ability of private security firms to
deescalate violence when pirates successfully board their vessels to be
a critical concern. But without clear, uniform standards guiding
performance by security contractors, it is doubtful that private
security firms will respond uniformly to pirate attacks.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the potential of using
contract law to provide guidance to private security firms engaged in
combating piracy. This Article examines how the intersection
between international law, maritime law, and contract law presents
particular challenges for shipping companies attempting to protect
vessels from pirate attacks in the vast area of the seas. Taking the
Maersk Alabama Attack as a representation of the challenges that face
shipowners, private security firms, and the government, this Article
employs a typical approach to contractual analysis by interpreting the
parties’ agreement in light of trade usage, public policy, and the
excuse doctrine.
I conclude that while the existing analyses regarding interpretation
may ultimately be helpful in forming an acceptable outcome for
security providers and shipowners alike, the traditional excuse
doctrine may prove unsatisfactory because it primarily focuses on
whether certain risks are foreseeable to the parties and does not
readily adapt to situations presenting extreme personal hazards
http://www.knowships.org/images/Roundtable-Anti-Piracy-Best-ManagementPractices.pdf [hereinafter BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES] (naming the following
organizations as industry representatives that support these best management
practices: the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, the
International Chamber of Shipping, the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum, the Baltic and International Maritime Council, the Society of International
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators, the International Association of Dry Cargo
Ship Owners, the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, the Cruise
Lines International Association, the International Union of Marine Insurers, the
Joint War Committee & Joint Hull Committee, the International Maritime Bureau,
and the International Transport Workers Federation).
27. See International Maritime Bureau, ICC Commercial Crime Services, Advice
to Masters,
http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=309&
Itemid=97 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter IMB Advice].
28. See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS,
COMPANIES, SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING
ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 1 (June 23, 2009),
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25976/1334.pdf
[hereinafter IMO REVISED GUIDANCE].
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to the crew, security forces, and third parties. Moreover, while
the excuse doctrine forms a helpful backup for unexpected
contingencies, it fails to inform parties about performance standards
at the earliest point in performance—where parties require more
guidance.
After discussing the importance of balancing the needs to protect
the crew and cargo, this Article proposes an analysis that would
evaluate the demarcation between functions assumed by private
security actors and those functions retained by governments. Such an
evaluation requires a contractual interpretation that takes into
account developing trade usage concerning the proper role of
security personnel. This approach is informed by analogy to the
common practices of employees and security personnel hired to
protect against armed bank robbery. This analysis is based on an
interpretation of risks associated with government functions that are
retained by the government in such cases, rather than assumed by
private actors. My proposed approach to security contracts involves a
novel method of applying contract interpretation doctrine—novel,
although it builds on existing doctrine regarding the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties and the role of trade usage,
as well as government functions retained even where contractors
also provide protections. Yet, this approach attempts to remain
committed to the ideal that parties will be bound by their
agreements.
I argue that, using the proposed approach, a
conceptually sound application of contract interpretation doctrine
can be obtained from existing law that holds private security
companies to their bargains in most circumstances, but encourages
parties to stand down when the risks associated with responding to a
pirate attack are too great.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTING FOR THE USE OF FORCE TO
COMBAT PIRACY
A. Crews and Contractors Ready to Defend

Shipowners and private security contractors are faced with the
challenge of protecting ships from pirate attacks under changing
circumstances that present risk of personal injury or death to crew
and security contractors, as well as the loss of the ship and its cargo.
The Maersk Alabama Attack is representative of one possible outcome
that may occur where a ship’s crew successfully fights against pirates
after the pirates board the ship. The use of force employed by the
Maersk Alabama crew led to the taking of Captain Phillips, a standoff
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with U.S. Naval forces, and the killing by snipers of the pirates on the
lifeboat with Captain Phillips. But the crew’s response might have led
to a less positive outcome. Protecting themselves and the cargo after
the pirate attack exposed the Maersk Alabama crew and all others
onboard to personal hazard.
Alternative responses and outcomes are presented in other recent
pirate attacks. For instance, private security onboard the Maersk
29
Alabama thwarted a second pirate attack. The owners of the Lynne
Rival had no onboard security, did not put up resistance, and have
30
been hostages ever since. An Italian cruise ship’s Israeli security
31
Some crew
officers repelled a pirate attack by returning fire.
members have not survived clashes with pirates. As mentioned
earlier, pirates killed the captain of the M/V Theresa in response to
32
his attempt to send off distress flares. The Chief Engineer of the oil
tanker Cancale Star died and other crew members were injured as the
33
crew successfully fought off pirates. Other freight ships have simply
hired security forces that are proactively ready to shoot across the
34
bow or employ non-lethal measures in the event pirates attack.
B. Combining International, Maritime, and Contract Law and Policy
The framing of a response by shipowners to the threat of piracy
depends greatly on, first, the extent to which international law
enables nations to successfully battle pirates; second, whether general
maritime law allows shippers to engage in self-help to protect crews
and cargos; and third, the terms of any agreement made with crew
and security teams to protect the ship, cargo, and crew. The threat of
29. See Schaeffer, supra note 11; see also Ryan Smith, Maersk Alabama Attacked by
Pirates Again! Private Security to the Rescue, Repels Somali Bandits, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov.
18, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/11/18/crimesider/entry5695715.shtml
(“Somali pirates took on the Maersk Alabama again Tuesday, but they were met by a
private security force which repelled the assault with gunfire and a high-decibel noise
device.”).
30. See sources cited supra note 17 (describing the capture of the British couple
who owned the yacht).
31. See Italian Cruise Ship Fights off Pirate Attack, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at A17
(reporting that this incident was one of the first armed exchanges between pirates
and a nonmilitary ship).
32. See Cowell, supra note 13 (describing the violent attack on the M/V Theresa).
33. See Pirates Kill Sailor in Attack on Oil Tanker off Benin, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8376715.stm (reporting that the pirates who attacked
the Cancale Star were thought to be from Nigeria).
34. See John Miller, Loaded: Freighters Ready to Shoot Across Pirate Bow, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 2010, at A18 available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126265833983415885.html (explaining that, in the
past, shipping companies and fishing vessels hesitated to employ armed protection
due to fears about liability for damage to freight and vessels).
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force and presence of patrols by the U.S. Naval forces, EU NAVFOR,
and others has been grounded in the authority granted under several
35
resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council. In particular, the
resolutions, since renewed, not only permitted nations an initial
twelve-month period to patrol the waters of the Indian Ocean off the
Somali coast, but also included provisions aimed at bringing pirates
using the territory of Somalia as a base to justice by permitting
36
pursuit of pirates into the territory of Somalia.
Moreover, the
authority included approval of measures targeted at suppressing
37
piracy in Somali waters for a period of six months.
These U.N. resolutions, though, only pertain to actions taken by
nations, rather than actions taken by private parties. With patrols
often hundreds of miles away, shippers must also depend on the
parameters of statutes and maritime custom and law to determine a
course of action. For U.S. flagged ships, the rules of federal maritime
law govern shipping contracts—such as those involving charter
38
39
parties, salvage, and insurance—that are not addressed by statutes.

35. See resolutions cited supra note 18. In November 2009, the Security Council
restated the challenges involved in dealing with piracy, and renewed and extended
for an additional year the authority to enter Somali territorial waters in Resolutions
1846 and 1851. S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); see also
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Renews for 12 Months
Authorization for States Combating Piracy Off Somalia’s Coast, Unanimously
Adopting Resolution 1897, U.N. Doc. SC/9799 (Nov. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9799.doc.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2010) (announcing the Security Council’s decision to renew previous authorizations
for States and regional organizations cooperating with the Somali Transitional
Federal Government to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and fight piracy and armed
robbery). Commentators have discussed how international law might function to
combat modern sea piracy. See Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and
Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (urging
world powers to confront Somali pirates because “the legal tools needed to capture
and prosecute these pirates already are in place”). Compare Michael Bahar, Attaining
Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory For Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2007) (arguing that extant international law is sufficient to
counter the reemergence of piracy and piratical terrorism), with Ethan Stiles, Note,
Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299 (2004) (concluding that extant international law does not
adequately address the modern threat of piracy).
36. See S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (stating that
states and regional organizations “may undertake all necessary measures that are
appropriate in Somalia” for the purpose of combating piracy).
37. S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
38. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 670 (4th ed. 2004)
(defining a charter party as “the principal document of the tramp shipping
industry”). A charter contract, for instance, effectuates the hire of an entire ship. Id.
The party chartering the ship is commonly referred to as the charterer or shipper
and the party supplying the ship is the carrier or shipowner. Id. Different types of
charters exist, including time charters, voyage charters, and bareboat charters where
the charterer takes control of the ship and mans it with its own crew. Id.

MARTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

1372

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/22/2010 7:55 PM

[Vol. 59:1363

Maritime contracts, though, are private agreements, so the parties are
generally free to allocate risks by express contract provisions
40
or by trade practices in the shipping industry. Accordingly, federal
maritime law typically embraces the general principles of common
41
law contract.
Among the charter clauses that give insight into the obligations of
crew and captain are the exclusions for “war risks,” which typically
42
include acts of piracy. A standard charter clause commonly allows
the master of the ship to discharge the cargo even when at sea, if the
43
crew, master, ship, or cargo is subjected to war risks.
Yet, one
important principle accepted under maritime and international law is
44
the recognition of the right of self-defense against piracy. Piracy is
taken so seriously that warships actually have an affirmative duty to
45
suppress piracy. Private ships also have an affirmative duty to render
39. Id. at 108; see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961)
(holding that contracts for hire of ships and sailors are maritime contracts subject to
admiralty jurisdiction); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 411 (1866) (holding
that a contract of transport on a vessel is a maritime contract within the jurisdiction
of admiralty); Morewood v. Enequist (The Gothland), 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491, 492
(1859) (holding that charter parties and contracts for shipping are maritime
contracts).
40. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 38, at 672 (indicating that, in practice, highly
standardized forms are frequently used).
41. Id. at 673; see also, e.g., Navieros Oceanikos v. S.T. Mobil Trader, 554 F.2d 43,
47 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying contract principle of interpretation against the
draftsman); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Diller, No. 07-cv-1131, 2009 WL 5171866, at *7 (D.N.J.
Dec. 23, 2009) (noting that, although federal maritime rules apply, state law often
provides the applicable rule); Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 4356(CM),
2009 WL 5102754, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2009) (finding that admiralty contracts
are generally construed like any other contract); T & O Shipping, Ltd. v. Lydia Mar
Shipping Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying contract law to
determine whether a forum selection clause was effective).
42. See, e.g., 2B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY Form No. 4-4A ¶ 14(b) (John C. Koster
ed., LexisNexis 2009). The standard bareboat charter form includes in the following
definition of war risks:
[A]ny war (whether actual or threatened), act of war, civil war, hostilities,
revolution, rebellion, civil commotion, warlike operations, the laying of
mines (whether actual or reported), acts of piracy, acts of terrorists, acts of
hostility or malicious damage, blockades (whether imposed against all vessels
or imposed selectively against vessels of certain flags or ownership, or against
certain cargoes or crews or otherwise howsoever), by any person, body,
terrorist or political group, or the Government of any state whatsoever,
which may be dangerous or are likely to be or to become dangerous to the
Vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel.
2B Id. at ¶ 26.
43. 2B Id. ¶ 14(d).
44. The editor’s comment to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1846 observed
that “forcible self-defense against pirate attacks is universally permitted under
conventional international law.” 6D BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY Doc. No. 13-14A (Frank
L. Wiswall, Jr. ed., LexisNexis 2008).
45. BURDICK H. BRITTIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 116 (5th ed.
1986).
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assistance to other ships in distress, which would surely include
46
helping ships being attacked by pirates.
Pirates are enemies of the human race—hostes humani generis—
47
posing a long recognized threat to shipping and commerce. While
international law universally permits forcible self-defense against
48
piracy by private parties, shipowners, shippers, masters, crew, and
security companies must reach consensus about when and to what
extent forcible self-defense may be employed. The IMO Guidance,
the IMB Advice, and the Best Management Practices not only
represent important guides to those planning security and crew
responses to piracy, but may eventually support the establishment of
some industry trade usage regarding precautions against and the
appropriate reaction to piracy at different stages of an attack.
The IMO Guidance addresses the issues raised for shipowners,
operators, masters, crews, and security providers by Somali pirates by
49
focusing on prevention.
The IMB Advice mirrors this focus by
directly advising vessels to follow the IMO Guidance and to “avoid
50
physical confrontation.” While the IMO Guidance provides that the
decision to follow its guide can only be made by the owners and
masters of the vessel, it does make specific recommendations
51
regarding engagement with pirates, weapons, and safety.
Specifically, the IMO Guidance approves the use of passive and nonlethal resistance, such as water hoses, netting, long range acoustical
52
devices, wire, and electrical fences. Regarding firearms and direct
engagement, the IMO Guidance is less supportive, warning of the

46. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 98. For an analysis of international humanitarian
conventions that provide legal protection to pirates, see Michael H. Passman,
Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 33
TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (2008).
47. E.D. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 299 (1994).
48. 6D BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 44; see also 33 U.S.C. § 383 (2006)
(giving merchant ships of the United States license to oppose and defend
aggression); UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87 (allowing freedom of the seas for
purposes of navigation); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 236 (1844)
(“But every hostile attack in a time of peace is not necessarily piratical. It may be by
mistake or in necessary self-defense, or to repel a supposed meditated attack by
pirates.”). The U.S. Coast Guard requires U.S. flagged vessels sailing off the Horn of
Africa to have an approved security plan. Press Release, United States Coast Guard,
Coast Guard Issues Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (May 17, 2009),
https://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/271953/.
49. See IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 2 (“It is important to
bear in mind that shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and crews can and
should take measures to protect themselves and their ships from pirates and armed
robbers.”).
50. IMB Advice, supra note 27.
51. IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 10.
52. Id. at Annex ¶ 56–57.
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dangers of firearms—both in terms of flammability of cargoes as well
as conflict with port rules banning their use—and outright
discourages the carrying of firearms for purposes of personal and
53
ship protection. The IMO Guidance is open to unarmed security
personal, noting the potential for security advice and enhanced
lookout capability, but is more cautious with privately contracted
armed security, noting that the presence of such security increases
54
the potential for escalation of violence and other risks. The IMO
guidance advises that if pirates succeed in entering the ship, the crew
and master’s focus should be on crew safety and maintaining control
55
of navigation.
Moreover, while crew counter-attacks of the type
mounted by the crew of the Maersk Alabama may at times be
somewhat successful, crews should not engage where there is any risk
56
to the crew or where the pirates are armed with weapons.
The Best Management Practices, supported by the vast majority of
shipowners and operators, takes a similar approach, reporting that
careful planning and passive counter-measures have enjoyed success
57
against pirate attacks. Recognizing that there is no one approach
for all ships and that the master must ultimately decide which
measures to employ, the Best Management Practices advise that the
use of unarmed guards “is at the discretion of the company but the
58
use of armed guards is not recommended.” The Best Management
Practices encourages the use of passive measures in response to an
attack, and in the event that the ship is boarded, recommends
offering no resistance, as resistance presents greater risk of violence
59
and harm to the crew.
While this general backdrop of law, policy, and practice begins to
sketch the decision-making process that crew and security forces
might undertake to counter the personal hazards presented by a
pirate attack, traditional contract excuse doctrine demonstrates that
failures by crew and security forces to engage pirates should not be
considered contractual breaches in some circumstances.
C. Excusing Security Forces Under Traditional Contract Doctrine
In the event that a contract dispute over performance arises
between a shipper or owner and a security provider after a pirate
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at Annex ¶ 59–61.
Id. at Annex ¶ 62–63.
Id. at Annex ¶ 71.
Id. at Annex ¶ 74.
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 12.
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attack, the shipper or owner could claim breach of contract for the
security contractor’s unsuccessful defense of the ship. A seemingly
obvious breach occurs when a security contractor simply abandons
ship at the sight of pirates. In comparison, a performing security
contractor who defends but stands down after pirates board the ship
might defend a claim of contractual breach by arguing that the
contract did not require the use of force in all situations.
Alternatively, the performing security contractor who stands down
after boarding might defend against the claim of breach under the
common law doctrine of excuse such that the shipowner or ship
operator is not entitled to damages because the problem was caused
by piracy (a traditional war risk).
Specifically, the security contractor will argue that it was ready and
otherwise able to perform the contract but that the actual boarding
of the ship by pirates created a contingency whereby engaging the
pirates with force “could lead to unnecessary violence and harm to
60
the crew.” The security contractor would also take the position that
the changing nature of hazards raised by pirates is not allocated to
security contractors merely by engaging in security contracts and is
not allocated to security contractors by trade usage (or alternatively
that the risk of piracy is allocated to shipowners, ship operators, and
61
their insurers). The security contractor would also assert that, at the
point pirates board a ship, performance is made impracticable
because the cost of overcoming the pirates would include not only
increased financial costs of an unknown magnitude, but also loss of
62
life or serious injury to crew and security personnel. The security
contractor will argue further that because performance of the
contract became commercially impracticable, he did not breach the
60. Id. For the elements of a claim of excuse based on impracticability, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). See also Transatlantic Fin. Corp.
v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315–16 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (providing that the three
elements of commercial impracticability are: (1) that a contingency occurred, (2)
that risk of unexpected occurrence had not been allocated, and (3) that occurrence
of contingency rendered performance commercially impracticable).
For a
discussion of the application of the impracticability doctrine to civilian-military
contractors, see Jennifer S. Martin, Adapting U.C.C. § 2-615 Excuse for Civilian-Military
Contractors in Wartime, 61 FLA. L. REV. 99, 108–09 (2009).
61. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 316–18 (noting that although the
allocation of risk may be expressed or implied in the agreement, the surrounding
circumstances should also be considered).
62. See id. at 315 (weighing the interest in enforcing contracts with the
consequences of requiring performance); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 90-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) ¶ 22,602, at 113,427 (A.S.B.C.A. Dec. 29, 1989) (finding no commercial
impossibility or impracticability where the cost increase resulted from a change of
port due to the threat of hostilities in the Persian Gulf and where the contract did
not require loading at a particular port).
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security contract because his performance was excused. Therefore,
the security contractor will assert that the shipowner or ship operator
is not entitled to resort to the normal contractual remedies for
breach of contract because there was no breach. Moreover, the
security contractor will argue that it is entitled to payment for services
63
provided under the contract.
If a security contractor decides to stand down when pirates board a
ship, the contractor would have a good chance of succeeding in a
claim for excuse with the argument that non-boarding by pirates was
the basic assumption of the contract (i.e., a contract for planning and
64
prevention). Of course, parties can include a contractual clause
addressing the conduct of security contractors in the event of
65
boarding, or they can simply include performance directives of the
type anticipated by the IMO Guidelines, which envision that crew and
security contractors will not engage pirates in hostilities where there
66
is risk to the crew. Where parties have not included such a clause or
the contract is not clear, a security contractor would have a strong
case that performance has become impracticable due to excessive
and unreasonable risk of personal injury or death to the crew and
security contractors (perhaps in addition to increased financial costs)
67
when pirates actually board a ship, though factual issues would have
68
to be resolved.
On the other hand, shipowners and ship operators could argue
that security contracts are not subject to excuse based on
impracticability because the risks of piracy are always foreseeable to

63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 (1981) (providing the
requirements for the relief of restitution); see also Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at
320 (“If the performance rendered has value, recovery in quantum meruit for the
entire performance is proper.”).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981) (noting that,
even if an event is foreseeable, foreseeability does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that non-occurrence was not a basic assumption on which both parties
made the contract).
65. See id. § 261 cmt. c (explaining that parties may insert provisions into a
contract that would require performance where the notion of “impracticability”
would otherwise justify non-performance).
66. See IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 74 (“The possibility of a
sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to
leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no
risk to the crew.”).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981) (“Performance
may be impracticable because extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury,
or loss to one of the parties will be involved.”) (emphasis added).
68. Factual issues might include whether the non-occurrence of the pirates’
boarding was a “basic assumption” and whether the contract allocated the risk. See
id. § 261 cmts. b, c (providing examples of factors used to determine whether a party
bears the risk or is discharged of a duty).
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parties entering into contracts for security in waters where there are
69
known and active pirates. Yet, foreseeability itself does not always
indicate that the event of pirates boarding the vessel was a basic
70
assumption of the parties. Shipowners and ship operators might
argue further that the risk of loss was allocated to the security
contractors if pirates boarding the ship was a basic assumption.
Both of these arguments—which together comprise what I
will term the “traditional analysis” of impracticability—deserve
further consideration.
Shipowners and ship operators could argue that they did not
assume the risks relative to boarding by pirates; rather, by hiring the
security contractors, they effectively shifted the risk to the security
71
contractors.
In other words, a security contractor’s act of
contracting for the provision of security services to protect against
piracy cuts off the contractor’s ability to later claim excuse when
pirates board the ship, and any non-performing security contractor
must be held accountable to shipowners and ship operators if they
fail to protect the ship when it is boarded by pirates. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes such a scenario, where
the parties’ expertise results in the owner allocating some risk to a
contractor, thereby precluding the contractor from claiming excuse:
A, who has had many years of experience in the field of salvage,
contracts to raise and float B’s boat, which has run aground. The
contract, prepared by A, contains no clause limiting A’s duty in the
case of unfavorable weather, unforeseen circumstances, or
otherwise. The boat then slips into deep water and fills with mud,
making it impracticable for A to raise it. If the court concludes, on
the basis of such circumstances as A’s experience and the absence
of any limitation in the contract that A prepared, that A assumed
an absolute duty, it will decide that A’s duty to raise and float the
boat is not discharged and that A is liable to B for breach of
72
contract.

69. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (noting that foreseeability may support, but is not sufficient to prove,
allocation of risk).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981) (providing that
foreseeability does not automatically result in the allocation of risk).
71. See id. § 261 cmt. c (stating that the court may determine under certain
circumstances that a party impliedly assumed greater obligations); see also Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 72-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 9186, at 42,589 (A.S.B.C.A. Nov. 19, 1971) (stating
that the court will construe and interpret specification provisions fairly and
reasonably); Aerosonic Instrument Corp., 59-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 2115, at 9,098
(A.S.B.C.A. Mar. 12, 1959) (finding that the appellant contracted to provide research
beyond the state of the art and that it therefore assumed the obvious risks).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. c, illus. 5 (1981).
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Because the security contractor made no promises concerning the
safety and security of the ship in waters known to inhabit pirates,
shipowners and ship operators could argue that the security
contractor contracting for protection against pirates is always obliged
to engage with force to meet its contractual obligations even when
73
pirates board the vessel. In short, shipowners and ship operators
could argue that they never promised (contractually) that protection
from pirates could be carried out safely and that the security
contractors at least impliedly understood and assumed this risk.
Upon paying the high prices charged by security contractors,
shipowners and ship operators could claim that they are entitled to
demand their services in all instances, such that the nature of the
relationship does not fit the traditional notions of excuse. As Judge
Skelly Wright observed in the well-known Transatlantic Financing Corp.
74
v. United States case relative to the closure of the Suez Canal:
Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they
cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy. Moreover,
that some abnormal risk was contemplated is probative but does
not necessarily establish an allocation of the risk of the contingency
which actually occurs. In this case, for example, nationalization by
Egypt of the Canal Corporation and formation of the Suez Users
Group did not necessarily indicate that the Canal would be blocked
even if a confrontation resulted. The surrounding circumstances
do indicate, however, a willingness by Transatlantic to assume
abnormal risks, and this fact should legitimately cause us to judge
the impracticability of performance by an alternative route in
75
stricter terms than we would were the contingency unforeseen.

Despite the arguments that shipowners and ship operators could
make under the traditional analysis, there are strong
counterarguments that security contractors may claim excuse when
73. See 14 JAMES P. NEHF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 74.8, at 54 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. LexisNexis 2001) (allowing parties to assume obligations that may be
discharged or formulate their own clauses); see also E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the contract language
to cover foreseeable contingencies); Roy v. Stephen Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 543 A.2d
775, 778–79 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the seller assumed the risk of
contingency where the seller knew of facts that made performance impracticable);
Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Lawson, 219 S.E.2d 167, 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
the seller assumed the risk of price increases in contracting to deliver goods to the
buyer and therefore was not excused from performance). But see Alimenta (U.S.A.),
Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Can.) Ltd., 802 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding
the jury’s determination that the seller did not assume risk of drought that prevented
peanut deliveries).
74. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
75. Id. at 318–19.
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pirates actually board a vessel, perhaps even where the parties include
provisions for pirate-boarding procedures in the contract.
True, security contractors are hired for the very purpose of
thwarting pirate attacks, which implies a degree of danger and
anticipates the potential for pirate boarding. Yet, recognition that
performance might be dangerous does not mean that security
contractors assume the risk of any and all dangers that pirates
present. One might observe that even those persons who perform
dangerous contracts do not necessarily agree to perform under all
types of dangers that might arise (i.e., one does not expect bank
76
employees to prevent all bank robberies).
As such, one would
expect that performance by security contractors who are recognized
as civilians—as opposed to government forces—would have some
natural limitations.
The risk that security contractors combating piracy with force
assume, if envisioned through contract, may well be interpreted to be
limited to tasks performed prior to pirate boarding. Additionally,
contractual “outs” excusing performance which ship operators and
others provide for in “war risk” clauses are recognized for acts of
piracy committed on the high seas. Moreover, maritime insurance
contracts obtained by merchant shippers typically contain coverage
for piracy, indicating that this type of contingency is assumed by
77
shipowners and ship operators, at least if pirates board the vessel.
But if the particular risks of engaging pirates who actually board the
ship are not assumed by security contractors and if the other
traditional elements of excuse are met (e.g., failure of a basic
assumption), a security contractor that does not engage pirates who
board a vessel with force could probably claim excuse and not be
78
liable for breach. Assuming that the particular uncertainties and
risks raised by pirates who actually board a ship are not assumed by
security contractors, excuse would likely be available.

76. See discussion infra Part II.B.
77. See KING, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing various forms of marine
insurance); see also Michael H. Passman, Interpreting Sea Piracy Clauses in Marine
Insurance Contracts, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 84–85 (2009) (listing factors courts
consider when determining whether an act constitutes “piracy” for purposes of
insurance contract interpretation).
78. If the security contracts were not entered into particularly to combat piracy,
but perhaps just for general purposes, the issue of allocation of risk for third-party
interference by pirates would not be as likely to come up in contract performance.
The risk would most likely be one not assumed by either of the parties nor one
necessarily in their contemplation. In such cases, availability of excuse is seemingly
permitted without much difficulty.
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Alternatively, an attempt by shipowners and ship operators to
disclaim the applicability of the excuse doctrine by including in the
contract provisions which delineate when excuse is available or
require performance in all cases (e.g., engagement with pirates using
force) might be ineffective. This would be the case if, for example,
the contractual provisions do not completely foreclose the availability
79
of the traditional excuse doctrine, or if the contract did not properly
outline which acts of piracy result in excuse or where security
contractors should stand down versus engage with force, or if the
80
shipowners or operators simply did not act in good faith. Boarding
of a vessel by pirates in such cases would seem to render performance
“impracticable,” and grounds for excuse would exist under the
traditional impracticability doctrine. On the facts of the Maersk
Alabama Attack described above, it would seem that, had security
contractors been onboard the vessel, they would have likely had a
good contract defense had they stood down and refrained from
engaging the pirates instead of using force as was ultimately the case.
Ultimately, granting security contractors a contractual out under
the doctrine of excuse in the event that they decide to stand down if
pirates board a vessel may be an incomplete approach.
Consideration of whether security contractors (and crew) should
stand down if pirates board a vessel is more valuable as it
addresses the boundaries of contractual obligation at an earlier
period during their performance of the contract. Concepts of
contract interpretation sometimes provide a route to allow (and
perhaps encourage) parties to cease performance under a contract.
Contract law, for example, allows parties in many cases to explain or
81
82
supplement contract terms with course of dealing, usage of trade,
83
course of performance, and by evidence of consistent additional

79. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2009) (stating that force majeure clauses are
considered under U.C.C. § 2-615 in light of “mercantile sense and reason”).
80. See First Nationwide Bank v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (providing that good faith is an implied condition); 8 CATHERINE
M.A. MCCAULIFF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 33.4, at 172 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed.
Lexis 1999) (discussing good faith as a restraint on contract performance). See
generally Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1968) (discussing
good faith as applied in contract law).
81. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223
(1981).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1981).
83. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2009).
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84

terms which anticipate the inclusion of the concept of “commercial
85
context” when interpreting a contract’s language.
Although security contracts require performance in international
waters where pirates may attack, the commercial context might call
for a response of non-resistance if pirates board. The next Section of
this Article will explore the role of interpretation and commercial
context when security contractors are part of the response to combat
piracy.
II. USING CONTRACT LAW TO INFORM COMPANIES AND SECURITY
PROVIDERS
A. Employing a Reasonable Interpretation Approach
Recall that there are two common arguments against permitting a
party to claim excuse due to piracy (and thus avoid damages for
breach of contract) under common law. The first argument, related
to the sanctity of the contract made by parties, is that most contracts
either expressly or impliedly place the risk that pirates will
successfully board on the security contractor. The second argument
is that even if the risk were not placed on the security contractor by
the contract, the contingency that arises is foreseeable so that the
security contractor cannot claim excuse when the contingency later
materializes, even if the parties did not mention the risk in the
contract. Several cases that examine claims of excuse ultimately
express their conclusions in terms of risk allocations, either by
interpreting the express language of the contract or by finding that
the contingency was foreseeable and that the risk resided with the
86
party claiming the excuse.
Despite these arguments, some commentators have argued that in
certain categories of cases, excuse is (or should be) available to
87
parties. Although the commentaries help by analogy to establish
84. See id. § 2-202; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1981).
85. See U.C.C. § 1-303 cmts. 1, 8 (2009) (rejecting both the “lay-dictionary” and
the “conveyancer’s” reading of a commercial agreement and permitting commercial
practices and dominant pattern to be incorporated into an agreement). See generally
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.9, at 149–50 (5th ed.
2003) (discussing questions of meaning commonly considered when interpreting an
agreement).
86. See cases cited supra note 73.
87. See Mark B. Baker, “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall”—Terrorism and Excused
Contractual Performance in a Post September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1, 4 (2004)
(post-9/11 terrorism cases); Suzen M. Grieshop Corrada, The Best Laid Plans: Force
Majeure Clauses in Travel and Event Contracts, 31 NOVA L. REV. 409, 421 (2007) (same);
Patrick J. O’Connor, Allocating Risks of Terrorism and Pandemic Pestilence: Force Majeure
for an Unfriendly World, 23 CONSTR. LAW. 5, 10–11 (2003) (same); Jennifer Sniffen, In
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some recourse for parties through excuse, none of the commentaries
establish a proper basis for either excuse or contractual
interpretation in the area of security contracting to combat piracy.
Part I of this Article provided an evaluation of the contract law
doctrine of excuse. What is needed to complete this analysis is a look
at how a commercial context might provide a standard for risk
allocation among security contractors, shipowners, and ship
operators prior to recourse to the excuse doctrine while remaining
consistent with the basic contract principles of context and
88
reasonable interpretation.
That is, the examination of security
contracts must take into account the “social matrix that includes
custom, trade usage, prior dealings of the parties, recognition of their
social and economic roles, notions of decent behavior, basic
assumptions shared, but unspoken by the parties, and other factors,
most especially including rules of law, in the context in which [the
89
parties] find themselves.” After surveying banking—a comparable
industry in terms of security contracts—and its response to criminal
activity, this Article will evaluate the role of trade usage, public policy,
and public interest as general guides setting the parameters of
contractual obligations under security contracts combating piracy.
B. Traditional Response to Bank Robbers as a Guide
Jim Nicholson was working as a teller at a Seattle branch of Key
90
Bank when a would-be bank robber entered and demanded money.
Nicholson ignored the robber’s demands, lunged at the robber,
chased him for several blocks, and pinned him to the ground until
91
police arrived.
Nicholson’s reward: Key Bank fired him for
violating a company policy that prohibited cooperating with bank
robbers and offering resistance and stated that “[o]ur policies and
procedures [to not attack robbers] are in the best interests of public
the Wake of the Storm: Nonperformance of Contract Obligations Resulting from a Natural
Disaster, 31 NOVA L. REV. 551, 553–54 (2007) (natural disasters).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (1981) (emphasizing that the
interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed at meaning of the terms in
light of the circumstances).
89. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3, at 10 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. West 1993). For a discussion of why courts should favor the
inclusion of trade usage to help define parties’ obligations, see Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem,
39 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2006).
90. See Joshua Rhett Miller, Seattle Bank Teller Loses Job After Thwarting Heist,
FOXNEWS.COM, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,536361,00.html; Jennifer Sullivan, Bank
Teller Foils Holdup, Nabs Suspect—Loses Job, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at A1, A8.
91. Sullivan, supra note 90, at A1.
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92

safety and are consistent with industry standards.” The prohibition
is in effect regardless of whether the person is a bank employee
93
The basic message to bank
or even an off-duty police officer.
employees and patrons is that money is insured, but lives cannot be
replaced.
The crime of robbery involves the taking of (or attempt to take)
something of value from another person by force, threat of force,
94
violence, or by putting the victim in fear. The Bank Protection Act
95
of 1968 requires banks to have a security plan in place to deter
96
robberies. The regulations under the Bank Protection Act provide
for a “security program” aimed at “identifying persons committing
crimes” and training employees to conduct themselves properly in
97
the event that the bank is robbed.
Similar to the regulations
promulgated by the United States, the New Zealand Department of
Labour’s advice on armed robbery recommends that bank
employees: (1) keep calm; (2) do what the offender demands; (3)
memorize details about the offender; and (4) note the method of
98
escape. Moreover, not only is having armed guards at banks not
required, but not having them at all might actually be the exercise of
99
sound judgment designed to protect human life.
Engaging the

92. Miller, supra note 90.
93. Id.
94. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 303 (2002).
95. Pub. L. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1881–84).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1882 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 208.61(b) (2009) (requiring that
member banks “designate a security officer who shall have the authority . . . to
develop . . . and to administer a written security program for each banking office”).
For general information about bank robbery in the United States, see FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 94, at 303.
97. 12 C.F.R. § 208.61(c).
98. NEW ZEALAND DEP’T OF LABOUR, DEALING WITH THE THREAT OF ARMED
ROBBERY: ADVICE FOR EMPLOYEES (1998),
http://www.osh.dol.govt.nz/order/catalogue/pdf/armdro-p.pdf; see also Webcast:
Robbery: Prepare to Survive (Dodgen & Associates),
http://www.dodgenandassociates.com/preview.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2010)
(emphasizing that being prepared and staying calm are vital to employee safety).
99. See, e.g., Nigido v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 A.2d 127, 129 (Md. 1972) (“If it is the
rationale of the bank that armed guards might provoke gun-play and that it is better
to lose cash than lives, then the total absence of guards would seem to be justified.”);
Genovay v. Fox, 143 A.2d 229, 239–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (“The value of
human life and of the interest of the individual in freedom from serious bodily injury
weigh sufficiently heavily in the judicial scales to preclude a determination as a
matter of law that they may be disregarded simply because the defendant’s activity
serves to frustrate the successful accomplishment of a felonious act and to save his
property from loss.”), rev’d on other grounds, 149 A.2d 212 (N.J. 1959). But see
Berdeaux v. City Nat’l Bank, 424 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982) (declining to hold the
bank liable when the customer was shot after the teller failed to do as the robber
ordered); Noll v. Marian, 32 A.2d 18, 19 (Pa. 1943) (same).
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robber with force is not recommended and is actually considered to
100
increase the risk of harm to all persons at the bank.
The practices of the banking industry relative to armed robbery
focus on preparation and avoidance, followed by a calm response and
compliance when robbed. The problem of armed bank robbery
presents some parallels with—and distinctions from—piracy that
might help inform the practices that could govern contracts to
combat piracy using security contractors. First, the object of both
piracy and robbery is the taking of something of value. In fact, most
pirates and robbers are motivated by the potential to make money,
101
although some might act solely to perpetrate an act of terrorism.
Second, both crimes are commonly perpetrated by criminals who
102
often travel in groups.
Third, both robbers and pirates use the
103
Finally,
threat of violence and carry weapons, most often guns.
while both crimes can result in significant loss to an individual victim,
104
the total loss is only a small amount within each industry as a whole.
Several distinctions suggest that the dangers associated with piracy
create a more volatile situation than the dangers associated with a
bank robbery. Whereas bank robbery has an almost sixty percent rate
105
of arrest, piracy occurs in international waters and, thus, catching
100. See Nigido, 288 A.2d at 129 (noting that “not providing armed guards might
very well reflect the exercise of sound judgment rather than negligence”);
Tony Brissette, 10 Potentially Catastrophic Mistakes During Bank Robberies,
BANKERSONLINE.COM, Mar. 2003,
http://www.bankersonline.com/articles/bhv12n12/bhv12n12a3.html (stating that
when “bank security guards, branch managers and other employees have physically
confronted bank robbers” it “increases the level of danger to all employees and
customers in the bank”).
101. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 6–7 (asserting that piracy has “become an
attractive pursuit for young men”); see also DUBNER, supra note 2, at 7 (offering the
argument that attacks imbued with a political nature could be considered acts of
war, rather than acts of piracy). While most piracy appears to be linked to
profitability, the attack on the U.S.-flagged M/V Liberty Sun may have been in
retaliation for the killing of pirates during the Maersk Alabama Attack. PLOCH ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 9.
102. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 6–7 (detailing the territorial pirate groups
operating in Somali waters); Brissette, supra note 100 (noting that while eighty
percent of bank robberies involve a single robber, takeover robberies with a group of
robbers has become more commonplace).
103. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 9 (stating that the typical Somali team of
pirates is equipped with AK-47 rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers);
Brissette, supra note 100 (noting that a lone robber may or may not display a weapon,
though takeover groups typically come in the bank with guns drawn).
104. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 94, at 305 (estimating that
bank robbers take approximately $70 million per year, with an average of $8000 per
incident); PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (acknowledging that the total economic
costs of piracy equal only a small fraction of the total value of worldwide ship-borne
commerce).
105. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 94, at 303 (highlighting the
57.7 percent clearance rate for bank robberies in 2001).
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and prosecuting pirates requires international cooperation.
Another important distinction is the prevalence of hostage-taking by
modern pirates. Pirates take hostages and engage in what are often
lengthy negotiations in order to secure a ransom, whereas many bank
107
robbers simply take their money and leave.
While the banking
industry is sensitive to the issue of robbery at particular locations, the
strategic location off the Horn of Africa affects a key transit area used
108
by a large number of merchant vessels. Finally, while bank robbers
may violate local law when committing the crime, piracy is a
universally condemned act, and pirates are the “enemies of all
nations and of the human race” who commit crimes punishable by
109
any nation.
While the analogy to armed bank robbery suggests that the same
type of cautionary approach might be applied to security contracts
for those combating piracy, it does not consider the differing trade
110
usages between banks and marine shipping.
Determining the
expectation of the contracting parties requires consideration of
context, making trade usage and the particular response by banks
111
helpful in deducing the obligations of the parties.
Essentially,
business norms form part of the basis of the agreement governing
particular contingencies. Trade usage normally connotes some type
112
of supplementation or qualification of the parties’ obligations. Yet,
the norms of one industry do not always apply to another industry,
depending on how parties define the industry or the geographic area
113
subject to the practice.

106. Cf. PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 22 (describing the IMO’s efforts to improve
antipiracy cooperation amongst nations).
107. See id. at 10 (finding that hostage taking is unique to the Somali pirates, who
seek payment of a ransom for the victims, rather than outright harming them);
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 94, at 312 (stating that violence and
injury during bank robbery is infrequent).
108. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 11–12 (reporting, for example, that “as
many as 3.3 million barrels of oil” transit the Bab el Mandeb strait every day).
109. H.B. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXT 118 (rev. ed. 1968).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1981) (listing the
considerations that a court makes when determining the existence and scope of
usage of trade).
111. See CORBIN, supra note 89, at 9–10 (noting that many factors help courts
determine the total legal obligation formed through a contract).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1981) (permitting usage of
trade that the parties know can supplement their agreement); 5 MARGARET N.
KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.14, at 127–28 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed.
Lexis 1998) (stating that supplementary terms help fill gaps in an express contract).
113. See KNIFFIN, supra note 112, § 24.13, at 111 (noting, for example, that an
“original condition” may have different meanings in the aircraft and refrigerator
industries).
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Thus, while the armed bank robbery analogy is helpful in
predicting a trade usage that might develop regarding security
contracts, the difference in industry could limit its persuasiveness.
Moreover, the usage prevalent in response to armed bank-robbery in
the United States could be less persuasive in light of international
considerations of jurisdiction, standards, and policies that are present
in the case of piracy off the coast of Africa. Further, the armed bankrobbery analysis does not consider the impact that hostage-taking
might have on the response of security contractors, suggesting that
the best response to pirates boarding a ship could differ depending
on whether hostages are taken. Despite these possible limitations,
the analogy to armed bank-robbery provides useful instruction that,
along with other evidence, helps develop the context that qualifies
party obligations under contracts between shipowners and security
teams.
Once it is recognized that the qualification of party obligations
depends on the principles of commercial acceptance and regular
observance in a designated industry, the need for standards
governing particular industries and contingencies, like piracy and
security contracts, is apparent. While parties generally should be
held to their contracts, the armed bank-robbery analogy provides a
convincing framework that warrants an understanding that crew and
security contractors, like bank employees, are not expected by the law
of contract (which would otherwise make them liable for breach) to
use force if pirates successfully board a vessel despite their efforts to
prevent the attack. As this Article shows below, any limitations on
applying this analysis to security contractors are mitigated by
examining how the maritime industry and the international
community may be moving toward a trade usage that is parallel to the
analogy of armed bank robbery.
C. Using Maritime and Industry Guides to
Determine and Supplement Party Intent
Some cases that discuss whether to incorporate trade usage into a
contract find that it is unnecessary to prove that the contract is
114
ambiguous before taking usage into consideration.
That is, the
114. See, e.g., L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, 880 F.2d 219,
223 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that trade usage can be
used to determine whether a contract is ambiguous). But see Corbitt v. Diamond M.
Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329, 332–33 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Hicks v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a court may not
look beyond the written language of the document to determine the intent of the
parties unless the disputed contract provision is ambiguous).
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inclusion of express contractual provisions regarding the use of force
by security contractors against pirates is not necessarily a bar to
115
It is necessary, though,
incorporating trade usage into a contract.
116
to establish that there is actually a usage involved in the industry,
which the bank-robbery analogy fails to accomplish by itself. It is
easier to find a trade usage where there is a regularity of observance
making it reasonable to expect that parties know the usage is
117
binding.
The presence of form contracts, different sizes of ships,
different cargoes carried by ships, and different nationalities of
shippers makes it difficult to clearly establish uniform maritime
industry practice in some cases.
To understand this point, one can look at the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Encyclopaedia
118
Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, where the court found no
trade usage regarding on-deck storage relative to a particular class of
119
vessels. The case involved a claim by Encyclopaedia Britannica, the
shipper, that 1300 cartons of encyclopedias were damaged by
120
breakage and seawater during a voyage from New York to Japan.
The short-form bill of lading contract did not address whether the
books would be stored on-deck or below, but incorporated by
reference the carrier’s regular bill of lading, which provided that the
goods could be stored under or on-deck, unless the shipper notified
121
the carrier that it needed below-deck storage.
Encyclopaedia

115. Cf. L.K. Comstock & Co., 880 F.2d at 223 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981)).
116. See Simon Wrecking Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 530 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715–16 (E.D.
Pa. 2008) (explaining that the term “sudden and accidental” in the pollution
exclusion contained in insurance policies did not have a trade usage in the insurance
industry, so a court would not vary from the apparent meaning of the language);
F.W.F., Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d
308 F. App’x 389 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that plaintiff yacht owners failed to
establish trade usage “that a yacht engine manufacturer assumes the responsibility to
do whatever is necessary to ensure the engines and vessel pass a sea trial when they
agree to perform an engine repair or repower” where the parties’ settlement
agreement did not so specify and the yacht owner failed to show that the words used
by the parties “have acquired by usage of trade a peculiar and different meaning with
reference to the general dealing of the trade or profession, and that they were so
used”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2001) (defining a “usage of trade” as “a usage having
such regularity of observance . . . as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to a particular agreement”).
118. 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969).
119. Id. at 18. But see English Elec. Valve Co. v. M/V Hoegh Mallard, 637 F. Supp.
1448, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d 814 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that above-deck
storage was an industry custom, at least with respect to container ships, where
shipper had some knowledge of custom).
120. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 422 F.2d at 9.
121. Id. at 9–10.
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Britannica claimed that the carrier issued what appeared to be a bill
of lading for below-deck storage, but then deviated by storing the
122
books on-deck.
The lower court viewed the case as a simple contract dispute
between two freely negotiating parties and concluded that
Encyclopaedia Britannica simply failed to provide the proper notice,
or, alternatively, that industry custom permitted the storage of
123
containerized cargo on-deck.
The Court of Appeals disagreed,
finding that the matter was complicated by the policy set forth in the
124
federal Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), which limits
125
The court explained that the
carriers’ ability to disclaim liability.
practice of requiring shippers to find a copy of the carrier’s regular
bill of lading “to discover a clause which in effect authorizes a serious
deviation from the standard provisions and which can only be
prevented by the shipper’s assuming the burden of giving notice to
the carrier before delivery that below-deck storage is required,” is no
more than a device around the general protections anticipated under
126
COGSA.
The court also found that no trade usage regarding on127
deck storage existed to supplement the bill of lading.
The court
found through testimony that the practice of some carriers of storing
items on-deck amounted to no more than habit contrary to the
128
desires of shippers.
The court also rejected other testimony
regarding on-deck storage, finding that it was restricted to “small
ships designed for island trade” and that it would have “no bearing
on any custom of stowing containers on the decks of general ocean129
going cargo vessels in international trade.” Finally, the court noted
that any practice in one port might not indicate a practice applicable
130
to other ports.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica decision exemplifies the challenges
that exist in establishing trade usages in the maritime industry.
122. Id. at 11.
123. Id. at 11, 17.
124. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1301–15.
125. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 422 F.2d at 11–12 (specifying that the
purpose behind COGSA was to fairly balance the competing interests of carriers and
shippers).
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id. at 17–18.
128. See id. at 18 (“A party cannot claim to have proved a valid custom merely by
showing that it is the habit of some carriers to stow goods on deck contrary to the
wishes or knowledge of shippers.”).
129. Id.
130. See id. (recounting the testimony of the carrier’s witness who testified that
incoming vessels from foreign ports would not show custom in the Port of New
York).
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Challenges certainly exist with attempting to establish a trade usage
regarding crew and security contractor responses to piracy,
particularly with respect to the use of force. First, as the Second
Circuit noted in Encyclopaedia Britannica, maritime industry practices
vary widely depending on where a ship is flagged, what country a port
is located in, and which nation’s policies are implicated. These
variables can present obstacles to the establishment of uniform,
recognized trade usage, though the promulgation of a number of
international and industry guidelines on the response to piracy may
131
help to clear this hurdle.
Second, the different types of ships
involved, the size of the crew, and the cargo carried can each heavily
influence the particular response to piracy that may be appropriate
for any one vessel. For example, a ship carrying flammable cargo
may be largely precluded from using certain weapons and types of
force in the response to piracy. Third, actions taken by some security
team personnel in response to piracy may not amount to a usage of
contract, but rather, actions beyond the law of contract and
contractual obligation (e.g., personal attempts to avoid becoming a
hostage) that are analogous to the “habit” precluding a finding of
132
trade usage in Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Fourth, the basis for
establishing trade usage is the uniformity of practice over a period of
time such that the practice is seen as part of the contractual
133
obligation.
While piracy has been a problem for merchants for
hundreds of years, a problem that has led them to arm their vessels at
certain points in history, our current initiatives regarding piracy are
directed primarily at piracy off the Horn of Africa, a more recent
phenomenon. A usage does not need to be “ancient,” but there is an
134
expectation of “commercial acceptance by regular observance” that
can be more difficult to document with emerging rules.
Despite the limitations associated with recognizing a trade usage
that would affect contracts with security contractors to combat piracy,
there are indications that a uniform approach—one highly consistent
with the approach to domestic armed bank-robbery—is emerging
(or, arguably, could already be in place). This developing trade

131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 cmt. c (1981) (“Where usages
vary from place to place, there may be a problem in deciding which usage is
applicable.”).
132. See 422 F.2d at 18 (“The mere habit of a carrier to stow cargoes anywhere it
chooses, even if it is in breach of its contract, cannot be said to establish a custom.”).
133. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1981) (“A usage of trade
. . . may include a system of rules regularly observed even though particular rules are
changed from time to time.”).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 cmt. b (1981).

MARTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

1390

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/22/2010 7:55 PM

[Vol. 59:1363

usage is evidenced by three different written recommendations: the
IMO Guidelines, the IMB Advice and the Best Management Practices
135
(collectively, the “Recommendations”). The emerging trade usage
focuses on preparation and avoidance rather than use of force, a
focus that is consistent with the general policy goals of the standard
response to armed bank-robbery. To the extent that trade usage is
emerging, it could become part of the obligations of parties to
security contracts, whether stated in express contract language or not,
so long as one considers the trade usage included by other contract
136
language or as supplementation to the contract in general. A trade
usage regarding the use of force in response to piracy could become
so pervasive that it would be unnecessary to inquire about the actual
intentions of the parties because the usage would be understood to
137
be part of the deal.
The emerging usage documented in the Recommendations
regarding the response to piracy takes up the issue of force in a
number of ways. First, parties are generally cautioned against having
firearms on the vessel, as such weapons could pose problems with
local regulations and could be dangerous depending on the cargo
138
that the vessel is carrying.
Second, the Recommendations
139
Third, the
discourage arming the crew for personal protection.
Recommendations recognize that companies may hire either
unarmed or armed security contractors, but emphasize that the
presence of armed personnel carries additional risks, including the
140
escalation of violence.
Fourth, the Recommendations suggest the
141
Once the
use of measures such as evasive maneuvers and hoses.
pirates board the vessel, the Recommendations shift their focus from

135. See supra Part I.B.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 220, 221 (1981) (describing
usage relevant to interpretation and usage supplementing an agreement).
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 cmt. a (1981) (“But if there is
a reasonable usage which supplies an omitted term and the parties know or have
reason to know of the usage, it is a surer guide than the court’s own judgment of
what is reasonable.”).
138. IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 59.
139. Id. at Annex ¶ 60.
140. Id. at Annex ¶ 63 (“If armed security personnel are allowed on board, the
master, shipowner, operator and company should take into account the possible
escalation of violence and other risks.”); BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 26,
at 5 (“The use of additional private security guards is at the discretion of the
company but the use of armed guards is not recommended.”).
141. See IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 65 (“Appropriate
passive and active measures, such as evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be
vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase or in the ship’s security
plan.”); BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 12 (listing methods that can
be employed to make it difficult for pirates to board the ship).
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active avoidance measures to securing the safety of the crew and
trying to remain in control of the ship’s navigation; they recommend
an organized confrontation with the pirates only if the pirates do not
have lethal weapons and only if the confrontation can be
142
accomplished without risk. If the pirates take control of the vessel,
the Recommendations stress the importance of remaining calm,
moving into a negotiating posture, and complying with the attackers’
143
demands as obstruction can be “futile and dangerous.” Finally, the
recommendations provide that there are no strict guidelines for
144
kidnapping situations, but that “survival” is the goal.
While there are some impediments to recognizing a firm trade
usage with respect to the appropriate response of security contractors
to piracy, there are arguments favoring the establishment of such a
usage. Although the Recommendations are not “ancient,” trade
usage can be based on change within the maritime industry, even if
145
there has not been time for regular observance.
The
Recommendations indicate a sense of universality, as the guidance
comes from disparate organizations:
a highly influential
international body, the International Maritime Organization; a highly
respected commercial organization, the International Chamber of
Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau; and fifteen different
maritime industry groups representing a wide variety of shippers,
from tank owners to cruise lines and even a transport workers’ group.
Moreover, a universality of observance in the maritime industry is not
required to show evidence of party intent regarding security
contractors, to the extent that the usage is “sufficiently general so that
146
the parties could be said to have contracted with reference to it.”
The Recommendations are very flexible and general on some points,
leaving discretion to the ship master where needed, but they give
specific directions on important points, like standing down if pirates
147
succeed in taking control of the vessel.
This flexibility allows the
142. See IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 71–74 (noting that the
options available to the master and crew depend on the extent to which the attackers
have secured control of the ship).
143. IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 76; BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 12 (“Offer no resistance; this could lead to unnecessary
violence and harm to the crew.”).
144. IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Appendix 4. The Best Management
Practices does not provide guidance in the event that the pirates take hostages.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 cmt. b (1981).
146. Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 526 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo. App. 1974).
147. See IMO REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at Annex ¶ 76 (“There will be
many circumstances when compliance with the attackers’ demands will be the only
safe alternative and resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and
dangerous.”).
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usage to address some of the specific deficiencies presented in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica case concerning different ships, cargos, and
148
local rules.
For purposes of security contracts, the most important aspect of
this usage would involve use of force in the event that pirates board
the vessel. If such usage were to exist, then security contractors
would not need to rely on the excuse doctrine to relieve them of
their contractual obligations. The usage would become part of the
149
parties’ contractual obligations. Instead, security contractors could
be comfortable with the practices that would be in effect both prior
to pirate boarding and after, whether or not expressed outright in
the contract. Thus, non-engagement with boarding pirates would not
be a breach of contract. Of course, in the event that the contract
expressly directs non-engagement upon boarding and a security
contractor responds with force, the case for breach would seem
stronger, more analogous to the situation of the Seattle bank teller
fired by Key Bank for failing to follow bank protocol of no
150
resistance. In the end, the preference for no resistance due to the
increased risk of violence and harm to employees makes the
preferred response by security contractors much like the response to
domestic armed bank-robbery.
While trade usage presents an alternative to relieving security
contractors of performance obligations involving the use of force
when pirates board a vessel, another alternative arrives at the same
result.
Even though there is a strong policy toward parties
performing contractual obligations, particularly where lives are at
risk, both excuse doctrine and trade usage may require refinement in
application to settle on a practice that protects crew and security
contractors. Limitations on the security contractors’ contractual
obligation to use force would also seem to be supported by policy
favoring the allocation to governments of the risks of armed
engagements. Such a policy—one that can be squared with the
Recommendations and good contract theory—can be obtained by
looking further into the larger context of the international
community’s response to piracy. This Article now turns to the role
148. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 18
(2d Cir. 1969) (examining testimony and concluding that the carrier did not present
sufficient evidence to establish that a custom existed).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3) (1981) (“Unless otherwise
agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or
a usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or
supplements or qualifies their agreement.”).
150. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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that public policy and overall context might play in supporting nonperformance by security contractors in this situation.
D. Considerations of Context and Public Policy
The Second Circuit in Encyclopaedia Britannica noted that some
arrangements are not simple matters of contract law, for instance,
where certain practices of maritime history and the government’s
response through COGSA and other acts effectuated a policy
governing the relationships of shippers and carriers in the maritime
151
industry.
This approach is certainly consistent with contract law,
which recognizes that contract terms may be unenforceable or
152
limited on grounds of public policy. Moreover, public policy would
certainly form part of the “relevant evidence of the situation and
relation of the parties” forming the context for supplementing the
153
agreement. To the extent that public policy calls for a limitation on
the use of force in piracy security contracts, such a construction is
154
entirely consistent with contract theory.
Public policy and context are particularly important with respect to
security contracts to combat piracy in the international waters off the
coast of Africa. With several U.N. Security Council resolutions in
place and a number of military vessels patrolling the waters off the
coast of Africa, these policies might guide our view of contractual
obligations affecting the use of force by private parties to combat
155
piracy.
That is, the allocation of responsibility between
governments and civilian parties may also have a part to play in terms
of policy affecting contractual obligations involving the use of force
by private parties to combat piracy. One might say that some use-offorce decisions are best made by governments, rather than by
contractual obligation. Of course, the vast territory of waters subject
151. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 422 F.2d at 11–12.
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 179, 183, 185 (1981).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (1981).
154. See id. § 207 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally
preferred.”); see, e.g., Herrera v. Katz Commc’ns, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying the principle that a meaning which serves the public
interest, such as awarding of attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases, will be preferred over
meanings which do not serve the public interest); Prouty v. Gores Tech. Group, 18
Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that public interest is served
by interpreting a company acquisition agreement to preclude early termination of
employees). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727, 728, 732–
33 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that the public policy of ensuring that victims of drunk
drivers have access to insurance did not demand that victim’s own insurance
company should pay punitive damages, which are generally focused on deterring
wrongful conduct).
155. See resolutions cited supra note 18 and accompanying discussion in Part I.B.
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to pirate attacks indicates that some private measures are appropriate
and necessary, making the role of private parties key in the effort to
combat piracy.
Security contracts to combat piracy present obvious differences
that distinguish them from routine maritime shipping contracts.
Determinations of risk allocation and interpretation are to be made
156
with reference to the “circumstances surrounding the contracting.”
Extending this analysis to piracy, the nature of the response by the
international community, the contractors’ civilian status, and the
particular circumstances of security contracting to combat piracy off
the Horn of Africa should factor into any recommendations for a
framework that would determine contractual obligations in this
context and what aspects of these contracts may be beyond the
general law of contract. Due to the measures taken by naval forces,
and due to the interest of the international community in securing
the high seas, it is not surprising that after pirates attacked the Maersk
Alabama a second time, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney applauded the
“maritime industry’s best-practices,” which focused on “pro-active”
157
measures aimed at preventing a ship from being taken.
Thus,
private contracts have a role to play.
The civilian status of the crews and security contractors is
important in defining their role by reference to the public interest
favoring non-resistance when pirates succeed in boarding vessels.
While merchant ships throughout history maintained arms onboard,
the practice fell out of favor due to concerns about liability and safety
158
of the crew and others. Because of the particular practices involved
in current pirate attacks, the public interest would arguably favor an
interpretation of contracts that protects human life, recognizing that
crew and security contractors could be killed—rather than merely
held for ransom—if they respond with force and fail to prevail over
159
the pirates.
Moreover, the objectives of the international

156. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2001).
157. Schaeffer, supra note 11.
158. See generally Bradsher, supra note 24, at A8 (considering safety considerations
and international law in the debate over arming crews).
159. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 31 (noting that a failed attempt to defend a
ship may, in turn, make the pirates more likely to kill crew members); Pirates Seize N
Korea Tanker Crew, supra note 13 (detailing the hijacking of a North Korean tanker in
the waters off Somalia and discussing a Spanish trawler and other ships and crews
that were held for ransom); Pirates Kill Sailor in Attack on Oil Tanker Off Benin, supra
note 33 (reporting the death of a chief engineer during a pirate attack off the coast
of Benin). The Supreme Court of Washington has observed that “[s]ociety places
the highest priority on the protection of human life.” Gardner v. Loomis Armored
Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (Wash. 1996) (holding that an employer wrongfully
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community might be compromised if the arms carried onboard
vessels become the targets of attack by those seeking to secure
additional weapons, or if the presence of the weapons encourages an
160
arms race between vessels and pirates.
Alternatively, government policy is also implicated if an armed
vessel creates its own security or terrorism risks while visiting a
161
nation’s ports.
Essentially, important limitations should be placed
on the means used by security contractors to perform their contracts
to combat piracy due to their status as civilians. For instance, in one
recent attack, private security forces, as opposed to international
naval forces answerable to the United Nations, killed at least one
162
For these reasons, any rule that
pirate in an attack on a vessel.
would expect security contractors to use force when pirates board a
vessel, or else be liable for breach in all circumstances, would
necessarily fail to take into consideration the policy and public
interest underpinnings involved in armed conflicts with pirates in
open waters.
For these public policy reasons, any argument favoring an absolute
rule encouraging contractual performance—particularly one that
anticipates the use of force answerable by an action for breach for the
failure so to act—even when pirates board a vessel, should not
succeed. The argument that security contractors have a contractual
obligation to use force in such cases does not take into account the
circumstances surrounding efforts to combat piracy. Appropriate
reasons for expecting contractual performance should not center
solely on the act of contracting for the provision of security, but must
take into account the limitations placed on security contractors due
to the risks of using force and their civilian status, rather than
government actors, in the fight against piracy. In short, the same
policies driving government authorities regarding armed bankrobbery—to secure the safety of persons over property, recognizing
terminated an armored car driver who left vehicle to save a woman from a lifethreatening hostage situation).
160. Bradsher, supra note 24, at A8 (reporting that the U.S. Coast Guard fears that
weapons onboard vessels could be used for terrorist attacks); PLOCH ET AL., supra note
3, at 31 (conveying the concerns of U.S. government officials that merchant ships
carrying weapons could pose security or terrorism risks to U.S. ports).
161. PLOCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 31.
162. See Alan Cowell, In First, Private Guards Kill Somali Pirate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2010, at A11 (reporting that pirates twice attacked a Spanish frigate, which
responded with gunfire by private security forces who killed one of the pirates raising
issues of responsibility and accountability). Naval forces released the pirates the next
day because the ship’s captain was unable to assist in the legal prosecution against
the pirates. Alan Cowell, Pirate Suspects Are Released by Naval Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2010, at A8.
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that civilians are safest when they are calm and compliant—apply to
the protection of civilians on vessels attacked by pirates.
The proposed practice of encouraging non-performance by
security contractors where the use of force might be required after
pirates have boarded the vessel should be limited to security contracts
where the use of force becomes a risk factor greater than offering no
resistance. Where parties to maritime contracts claim excuse or that
trade usage supports their position, common law principles will often
apply without special considerations. Thus, such a party would not
likely need the protections of the proposed practice as there is
general precedent for many other cases of non-performance. The
proposed procedure for excusing security contractors from using
force once pirates board the vessel is based on existing contract-law
doctrines. The logical development of this procedure from the
163
established doctrines has been described above.
The suggested
applications of each are based on sound public policy from which a
court could conclude that certain contingencies presented by pirates
should not be met by security contractors driven by contractual
obligations to use force. Rather, the practice of standing down is
arguably more in line with trade usage and the public interest.
CONCLUSION
A security contractor facing many of the perils of piracy will, in
most cases, be held to performance or will otherwise face a claim for
breach. The simple reason is that shipowners and ship operators may
perceive that the heightened risks associated with sailing off the Horn
of Africa create a special need to protect lives and cargo, a need
which favors holding the parties to the terms of their bargain. That
said, a security contractor on a vessel boarded by pirates experiences
a contingency involving a substantial risk of death or personal injury
to the crew and contractor personnel and should be able to claim
that any obligation to use force under the contract is excused.
Theories to the contrary that either bar the application of the excuse
doctrine or favor excuse for all acts of a public enemy (here, pirates)
are not consistent with contract theory. For instance, any theory that
would prevent recourse to excuse would be contrary to contract
doctrine that surely contains such a contractual out. There is little
basis in law or policy regarding civilians acting as security contractors
to take on the particular demands that the hostility of a pirate attack
in international waters present. Thus, the shipowner or ship
163. See discussion supra Part II.A.

MARTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/22/2010 7:55 PM

FIGHTING PIRACY WITH PRIVATE SECURITY MEASURES

1397

operator should not be able to recover damages based on such
breach because the defense of excuse should be available to the
contractor.
Some cases and commentaries regarding the impracticability
doctrine unduly limit the application of excuse or lead to contractual
uncertainty, leaving recourse to contractual theories such as
interpretation to allocate performance obligations helpful to parties
at the time of performance. Allocation of performance obligations
customary for the response to armed bank-robbery, in particular,
provides a framework for the establishment of an approach to
interpretation through trade usage that is analogous to what should
be our expected response to pirate attacks. As with the response of
bank security guards to an armed robbery, an interpretation of
contractual obligations that focuses on preservation of life and
allocates to government actors the responsibility for crime-fighting is
compelling if such an interpretation can be obtained through trade
usage, public policy, or considerations of public interest. As a result,
guidance to security contractors should include methodology
designed to interpret contractual relations in the context of the
particular nature of using private security contractors in the battle
against piracy.
This Article proposes that we interpret security contracts in a way
that considers the emerging trade usage that favors non-resistance to
pirates who successfully board a vessel. This proposed view of the
obligations of the parties to a security contract recognizes that there
are some cases where a security contractor should not face a claim of
damages for breach of contract if the security contractor does not
respond to a pirate attack with use of force, having considered the
risk to crew that could result if such resistance fails to deter the
pirates. Contract law already considers trade usage as part of the
process of interpreting contractual obligations where the usage is
sufficiently universal to become part of the bargain. Thus, this
proposed view of these contracts is firmly grounded in general
contract theory.
The focus of this proposed solution is identifying and
understanding—at the earliest stage of contract performance—the
parties’ expectations in the event of a pirate attack that is successful
in taking the vessel, so that the courts and the parties will know when
the use of force is not contractually obligated and when failure to use
force is not a breach. Because contract law already recognizes that
trade usage forms an important part of the allocation of responsibility
between parties and expectations in general—either expressly or
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impliedly—this proposed view does not require any change in the
law. Thus, while contract law would require performance generally,
the contract theory of trade usage would find that performance does
not include the use of force when pirates board a vessel on the basis
of emerging trade usage, as expressed in the Recommendations.
This approach to contractual obligations under security contracts is
also supported by contractual reference to public policy and the
public interest generally. Unlike the application of the classic excuse
doctrine or trade usage theory, however, public policy and the public
interest takes into account the interest of the national and
international actors who are also combating piracy through
diplomatic channels and military actions, including patrols of the
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. These policies would favor
contractual interpretations that limit the use of force by civilians
against pirates where there are also government actors involved and
such force has the potential of not only harm to the crew and security
contractors, but also the risks of setting off arms races, terrorism, and
security problems in ports. As a result, security contractors would be
justified in declining to use force if pirates successfully take a vessel
because of the risk to the crew and contractors and the need for a
more international response to the piracy.
In short, while the traditional excuse doctrine offers less clarity and
consistency when applied to the responses of security contractors to
piracy, interpreting contracts for onboard security forces in light of
the applicable trade usage does not always require scrupulous
performance in all cases. The emerging trade usage and existing
public policy allows the parties to gain a better understanding of their
obligations, including the understanding that the security team’s
decision to not use force when pirates board does not breach the
contract. Instead, it could be that an international or military
response is proper, or that the risks accompanying the use of force
outweigh the potential benefits. Excusing the performance of
security contracts to combat piracy in some cases is solidly grounded
in existing methods of contractual interpretation; excuse gives effect
to the unique context in which these contracts are formed and the
developing trade usage, which disfavors active resistance when pirates
successfully board a vessel.

